On murder rates in Stateless societies
April 21, 2009 – 9:58 pm by JohnProfessor Long is pretty much awesome. I would say that of all living political philosophers, his ideas and conclusions about liberty, government, economics, and society match my own (and, in fact, have helped me enunciate my own) more than any other. I don’t consider myself very much of a cultural leftist, though—but that fact, combined with the fact that overall I still concur with and admire his ideas to a greater extent than all or most other philosophers, underscores the perfection with which he enunciates notions that had formed only vaguely in my mind, matches my philosophy in almost every way, and introduces me to entirely new ideas, arguments, or ways of thinking about them.
One example of this is his exposition of his stances on children’s rights. It is very difficult to talk in absolutes about children because their intellectual, moral, and social development is not very mature until they’re, well, not children, and this happens at different rates, at different times, and in different ways for all children. What this really means for owning property, consenting to sex, and suchlike is hard for honest people to conclude definitively. He analyzes and explains his positions, which I think should be regarded as the general libertarian positions, expertly.
The latest example and impetus for this post is Peace through Statism?, about the tired claim that anarchy breeds violence, combat, blood-feuds, warlord-led gangs, and a resultant higher murder rate than exist in Statist societies, even accounting for wars. I recall a Rad Geek post about this same claim, from Jared Diamond, that was also unconvincing. Roderick Long makes the best argument I’ve heard against the “Statism-is-peace” position:
On states and violence, though, I’ve got to disagree – I think it’s confusing cause and effect.
States are a luxury good (well, a luxury bad from my point of view – but a luxury commodity in any case); they fund themselves out of the social surplus. So a society needs to achieve a certain level of prosperity before it can have much in the way of a state; and it can’t achieve that level of prosperity if it’s racked by constant tribal warfare. So it’s no surprise that the societies that are racked by tribal warfare tend to be the stateless ones – but it’s the violence that explains the statelessness, not vice versa. As Thomas Paine noted, states piggyback on autonomously arising social order and then claim to have created it.
I think this is because states are essentially parasitic and don’t contribute to social order at all – rather the contrary, when they arise they hinder the further advance of cooperation and economic development more than they help it. (Certainly when states are imposed, or attempted to be imposed, on violent tribal societies it tends to exacerbate the violence, since there’s now a big gun in the room – the state apparatus – that each tribe needs to seize lest some other tribe seize it first.) But even if one thinks states are a good thing, they’re still an expensive thing, and so require a pre-existing attainment of a fair degree of peaceful commerce and productivity before they can get going.
Moreover, when large states consolidate their power and displace a previous more decentralised and more peaceful state situation, the result is often genocide (as the history of the 20th century demonstrates). That’s another reason for thinking that states are the effect rather than the cause of peace.
If some degree of peace and prosperity is needed to make states possible, then we’re going to get misleading data when we compare economically undeveloped, culturally tribal, relatively stateless societies with economically advanced state-ridden societies; the latter will often be more peaceful, and so we’ll be tempted to think that the state is what’s making the difference, but that inference just doesn’t follow.
Thus a more interesting comparison is to compare relatively stateless and relatively state-ridden society that are otherwise at comparable levels of economic development and cultural mores.
When we do that, I think we get a very different picture. Ben Powell’s research, for example, shows that stateless Somalia, while undoubtedly a crappy place to live, has been both more peaceful and more prosperous than either its earlier state-ridden self [argh, I actually wrote “earlier stateless self” but then corrected in a subsequent post] or its economically and culturally comparable neighbours. I would also point to the research of Bruce Benson and David Friedman on how relatively stateless medieval Iceland and the relatively stateless American frontier were far less violent than comparable state-ridden societies of the time.